Pegisai at a Glance: Sources, Logic and Arguments

This page backs every statement on Pegisai at a Glance, item for item and in the same order. Each item quotes the statement the item backs. Where a statement is drawn from Pegisai™’s own published record, the item names where the record publishes the statement. Where a critic is likely to challenge a statement, the item sets out what the statement means, the logic, the sources and data, and the critic’s questions, answered. Pegisai’s own estimates are marked as estimates, with the inputs shown. Every figure was checked against the figure’s source on 7 October 2026.

About the Pegisai Group and the Group’s objectives

About the Pegisai Group

The statement

The Pegisai group licenses the technologies that comprise the Alkaimi Financial Ecosystem™ to bank holding companies. Group companies, under the management of Pegisai Global Holdings, administer and facilitate ecosystem operations under contract, while also providing network, security, and other mission critical services to ecosystem licensees.

Published in

Pegisai, About

The Pegisai Group’s objectives

The statement

Pegisai Group companies, along with the ecosystem’s licensees, seek to through thoughtful, diligent, cautious and cooperative conduct, influence into existence a fundamental paradigm shift in how the global financial grid is capitalized and liquidity is created, managed and distributed.

What this means

Pegisai technologies unlock in-ground resources, used in the global financial system to reduce reliance on the fiat lending system, in order to restore value to currencies and provide a new value pool for economic expansion, without the effects caused by the existing system listed below on this page.

The logic

The shift is already operating: since 1 September 2026, licensed member banks in 14 countries have conducted wholesale settlement on the Alkaimi ledger.
The value behind that settlement comes from private asset holders, recognized in 17 asset classes, not from new debt.
The work runs inside existing law: each member bank operates under the bank’s own charter and the bank’s own regulator.

The sources and data

Figure	Value	Date	Source
Wholesale settlement operations began	1 September 2026	Ongoing	Pegisai release, 30 September 2026
Nations with member banks operating	14	30 September 2026	Pegisai release, 30 September 2026
Asset classes recognized by member banks	17	1 October 2026	Pegisai release, 1 October 2026

The critic’s questions, answered

Is the Alkaimi Ecosystem™ operating, or still a plan?

Operating. Since 1 September 2026, licensed member banks in 14 countries have conducted traditional wholesale settlement on the Alkaimi™ ledger, and member banks recognize value in 17 asset classes (Pegisai releases, 30 September and 1 October 2026). Consumer services wait on the members’ common decision, made with each member’s own regulator.

Reasons behind the Pegisai Group’s objectives

Reason 1: the promises

The statement

Derivatives now total more than 5 times all the money in existence.
The world’s financial system is under extreme stress. The largest banks hold about $844.6 trillion in derivatives: promises and claims against each other, many uncollateralized. The promises depend on how rates, currencies and loans move, and on the capital reserves of each bank holding or owing a claim.

What this means

Banks have written promises to one another worth far more than all the cash and reserves in the world. The promises hold only as long as every bank on the other side keeps paying.

The logic

Banks hold contracts whose payments depend on other banks performing.
The face value of those contracts was $844.6 trillion at the end of 2025.
Every official reserve on earth, foreign exchange, gold and IMF Special Drawing Rights together, totals about $19.2 trillion.
The promises are about 44 times every official reserve that could stand behind the promises.

The sources and data

Figure	Value	Date	Source
Over-the-counter derivatives, notional outstanding	$844.6 trillion (see note)	End of December 2025	ISDA on BIS statistics
World foreign exchange reserves	$13.22 trillion	Second quarter 2026	IMF COFER
Gold held by central banks and official institutions	About 38,670 metric tons, about $5 trillion	End of 2025	World Gold Council
IMF Special Drawing Rights allocated	SDR 660.7 billion, about $0.94 trillion	2026	IMF
All official reserves (foreign exchange, gold and SDRs)	About $19.2 trillion	2026	Sum of the three rows above
US currency in circulation	$2.42 trillion	October 2025	Federal Reserve
Promises (notional amount) against all official reserves	About 44 times	2026	$844.6 trillion ÷ $19.2 trillion
World broad money (all the money in existence)	About $150 trillion, as reported	June 2026	Financial news reports of global broad money data
Derivatives against world broad money	More than 5 times ($844.6 trillion ÷ about $150 trillion = 5.6)	End-2025 against June 2026	Pegisai arithmetic
All issued cash worldwide	About $8 trillion	2025	Central bank currency in circulation, aggregated

Why the $844.6 trillion is a concern

The $844.6 trillion is the face value of promises banks have made to one another and to their clients. Pegisai’s concern isn’t that the $844.6 trillion is owed. Pegisai’s concern is what happens when the promises are called.

The promises are tightly linked: when one bank fails, the failed bank’s unpaid claims carry the failure to the next bank, as Lehman Brothers’ did in 2008. The promises are concentrated in banks too big to fail, banks rescued again and again since 1972. The promises keep growing: $683.7 trillion in mid-2008, $844.6 trillion at the end of 2025, even as market value fell. And in a crisis, the promises turn into sudden cash demands: in 2022, Britain’s pension funds could not meet their collateral calls, and the Bank of England had to step in.

When the banks cannot pay, governments step in, and the bill lands on taxpayers and on everyone holding the currency.

The concern	Where this page proves it
Who owes the promises	Banks, to one another and to their clients, and what the notional amount measures
Linked	How one failure travels through unpaid claims and the swaps that insured them: Lehman Brothers and AIG
Concentrated	Banks rescued as too big to fail, 1972 to 2023
Growing	$683.7 trillion to $844.6 trillion while market value fell
Sudden cash demands	Britain’s pension funds and the Bank of England, 2022
Who pays	Taxpayers and currency holders, through taxes and through prices

Note on the $844.6 trillion figure

The $844.6 trillion is the notional amount of over-the-counter derivatives outstanding at the end of December 2025 (ISDA, on BIS statistics). The notional amount is the face value of every contract: the amount on which each contract’s payments are calculated. The page uses the notional amount because the page’s question is the size of the promises banks have made to one another, and the notional amount is the BIS’s own headline measure of that size.

The same report gives a gross market value of $22.8 trillion: the cost of replacing every contract at that day’s prices. The BIS treats gross market value as the better gauge of market risk, the risk that prices move. For the page’s question, gross market value understates what is at stake, for four reasons.

Gross market value is a snapshot taken in a calm market. In the second half of 2008, gross market value rose 66.5 percent in six months, from $20.4 trillion to $33.9 trillion, while the notional amount fell 13.4 percent (BIS, 13 November 2008 and 19 May 2009). The measure is smallest when markets are calm, and the measure jumps when markets fail.
Gross market value assumes every counterparty keeps paying. The measure also assumes that netting and collateral work as written. After netting, the same report puts gross credit exposure at $3.4 trillion. Those netting and collateral assumptions hold while markets function, and those assumptions break in a crisis.
Weakened banks face runs on the banks’ derivatives. When a dealer bank weakens, the bank’s derivatives counterparties pull away much as depositors run on a bank, draining the bank’s cash and speeding the failure. One failure rarely stays at one bank: collateral is pulled, contracts are closed out at stressed prices, and the next weakest dealer is hit. Stanford economist Darrell Duffie set out these failure mechanics through the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers (Duffie, “The failure mechanics of dealer banks,” BIS Working Paper 301, March 2010; How Big Banks Fail and What to Do About It, Princeton University Press, 2010).
In two large parts of the market, the notional amount is the payment itself. A foreign exchange contract exchanges the full principal at settlement: foreign exchange derivatives stood at $148.7 trillion at the end of 2025 (ISDA, on BIS statistics), and at mid-2025 the BIS counted $100 trillion of foreign exchange forwards and swaps maturing within a year (BIS, 8 December 2025). A credit default swap pays the swap’s notional amount, less recovery, when the borrower defaults: the protection AIG had sold became the $182.3 billion the US government made available to AIG (GAO-09-975). In a cascade of failures, more contracts reach those full payments at the same time, and the cost of the promises moves from market value toward face value.

The page measures the promises at face value. The page never claims the $844.6 trillion is owed at once. The page claims the $844.6 trillion is the size of the promises the financial system depends on.

Figure S1. Notional amount against gross market value. Each panel has the panel’s own scale. In the second half of 2008, the notional amount fell 13.4 percent while gross market value rose 66.5 percent, from $20.4 trillion to $33.9 trillion. Sources: BIS, 13 November 2008 and 19 May 2009; ISDA, July 2026.

Part of the market	Notional amount	Date	What the notional means for payment	Source
Interest rate derivatives	$669.5 trillion, 79.3 percent of the total	End-December 2025	Payments calculated on the notional; the notional itself is not exchanged	ISDA, July 2026
Foreign exchange derivatives	$148.7 trillion (mid-2025: $100 trillion of forwards and swaps maturing within a year)	End-December 2025	The full principal is exchanged at settlement	ISDA, July 2026; BIS, 8 December 2025
Credit default swaps	$11.0 trillion	End-December 2025	The protection seller pays the notional, less recovery, on default	ISDA, July 2026

Why the size of the promises matters to Pegisai. One of the Pegisai Group’s objectives is to reduce this risk as close to zero as structure and operation allow. On the Alkaimi ledger, a DTA™ settlement leaves no claim between member banks, and every position is held whole, underwritten and segregated, so no settlement adds to the $844.6 trillion pile (Pegisai at a Glance, “How the Alkaimi Ecosystem meets the Group’s objectives,” items 3 and 4).

The critic’s questions, answered

Notional value is not what banks owe each other.

Correct, and the page does not claim otherwise. The notional amount measures the size of the promises. The note below this section sets out why the page uses the notional amount, and why the smaller market value understates what is at stake in a failure.

The Bank for International Settlements calls market value the better measure.

For the risk that prices move, yes. Even that smaller measure, $22.8 trillion at the end of 2025, is larger than every official reserve on earth, about $19.2 trillion, and in the second half of 2008 the same measure rose 66.5 percent in six months.

Reason 2: no one can pay if the system stalls

The statement

Derivatives are a greater threat than governments can fix.
Globally, governments and central banks do not hold enough cash and reserve assets to pay every bank claim if the financial system stalls. Taxpayers cannot cover the gap either.

What this means

If those promises come due in a crisis, governments do not hold enough to pay the promises. The money a government would use is borrowed or created, and the bill lands on the public.

The logic

Every official reserve on earth totals about $19.2 trillion.
Governments already owe about $99 trillion of the governments’ own debt, about five times those reserves.
A government can pay a claim only with money the government holds, borrows or creates.
Behind the deposit insurance funds stand the taxpayers, and the US fund holds $1.48 for every $100 of insured deposits.

The sources and data

Figure	Value	Date	Source
Global public debt	About $99 trillion, 93 percent of world GDP	End of 2024	IMF Global Debt Monitor
Government debt against all official reserves	About 5 times	2024 to 2026	$99 trillion ÷ $19.2 trillion
Cost to replace every promise at market prices, against all official reserves	About 1.2 times	2025 to 2026	$22.8 trillion ÷ $19.2 trillion = 1.19
US federal deficit, first 11 months of fiscal year 2026	$1.97 trillion (about $2 trillion)	October 2025 to August 2026	US Treasury; CBO Monthly Budget Review
Deposit Insurance Fund reserve ratio	1.48 percent ($1.48 per $100 of insured deposits); fund $161.1 billion	30 June 2026	FDIC

The critic’s questions, answered

Governments own land, minerals and companies.

Land does not pay a claim; cash does. Turning land into cash takes a buyer and takes time, while claims in a stall come due in days. In a crisis the buyers step back: in the week to 1 April 2020, the Federal Reserve bought $362.5 billion of US Treasury debt because private buyers would not.

A central bank can always create the money.

Yes, and reason 4 shows the cost. Money created to pay a claim takes the money’s value from every holder of the currency.

Reason 3: the stalls, the rescues and the bills

The statement

The derivatives issue is over 25 times global COVID-19 measures.
The global economic system has stalled before, as it did during the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent history shows us stalls are more frequent, and ever more expensive, so much so that governments and central banks lack the ability to intervene again.

What this means

Crises are not rare. Each rescue was paid for with new debt or created money, and each one left the system carrying more debt than before.

The logic

Rescues of failing banks and markets have recurred for more than fifty years (Figure S2).
Since 2008, each rescue has been paid with money a central bank created.
The debt from the 2020 rescue was rolled over, not repaid: the US national debt stood at $40.26 trillion on 1 October 2026.
Each new rescue starts from more debt and higher interest rates than the rescue before.

Figure S2. Rescues of failing banks and markets, 1972 to 2023. The rescues grow larger and more frequent, and since 2008 every rescue has been paid with money a central bank created. Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary 2017-17; Federal Reserve History, Continental Illinois; Congressional Research Service RL30232; GAO-09-975; Federal Reserve H.4.1; Bank of England; Federal Reserve testimony, 28 March 2023.

The sources and data

Figure	Value	Date	Source
Federal assistance made available to AIG	$182.3 billion	September 2008 to April 2009	GAO-09-975
AIG assistance recovered	$182.3 billion recovered, plus a $22.7 billion positive return	December 2012	US Treasury
Federal Reserve total assets	$0.905 trillion to $4.50 trillion	3 September 2008 to 7 January 2015	Federal Reserve H.4.1
Federal Reserve Treasury purchases in one week	$362.5 billion	Week to 1 April 2020	Federal Reserve H.4.1
Federal Reserve total assets	$4.16 trillion to $8.97 trillion	26 February 2020 to 13 April 2022	Federal Reserve H.4.1
US consumer price inflation, peak	9.1 percent (12 months)	June 2022	BLS
Withdrawals from Silicon Valley Bank in one day	$42 billion	9 March 2023	Federal Reserve testimony
Federal Reserve total assets, one week	Up about $297 billion	8 to 15 March 2023	Federal Reserve H.4.1
Primary credit (discount window) loans, record	$152.9 billion	15 March 2023	Federal Reserve H.4.1
One 2008 dollar, purchasing power	83 cents (2020); 71 cents (2023); 64 cents (July 2026)	CPI annual averages 2008 215.303, 2020 258.811, 2023 304.702; July 2026 333.918	BLS
One dollar since August 1971	Buys what 12 cents bought in 1971	CPI August 1971 40.8; July 2026 333.918	BLS
US gross federal debt	$23.20 trillion to $27.75 trillion (up $4.55 trillion)	31 December 2019 to 31 December 2020	US Treasury
US gross federal debt	$40.26 trillion	1 October 2026	US Treasury
ECB pandemic purchase program	€1,850 billion	Envelope set December 2020	ECB
Bank of England asset purchases	£895 billion	Total set November 2020	HM Treasury and Bank of England
UK consumer price inflation, peak	11.1 percent	October 2022	ONS
Global public debt	About 84 percent of world GDP (2019); peak 98.9 percent (2020); 93.9 percent (2025)	2019 to 2025	IMF Global Debt Monitor; IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2025 and April 2026
Average interest rate on US marketable debt	1.541 percent to 3.348 percent	January 2021 to January 2026	US Treasury
30-year Treasury bond auction, high yield	5.308 percent	10 September 2026	TreasuryDirect
US net interest outlays	3.3 percent of GDP, about $1 trillion	Fiscal year 2026 (projection)	CBO
Global government support for COVID-19	Nearly $16 trillion	Through March 2021	IMF, Fiscal Monitor, April 2021
Central bank balance sheet expansion during COVID-19	About $10 trillion	2020 to 2021	IMF
Derivatives against the whole COVID-19 response	Over 25 times ($844.6 trillion ÷ no more than about $30 trillion)	End-2025 against 2020 to 2021	Pegisai arithmetic

The critic’s questions, answered

The rescues worked.

The rescues stopped the failures. The rescues did not remove the cause, and the bill stayed: one 2008 dollar buys about 64 cents of goods today, and the 2020 debt was rolled over at higher rates. AIG’s assistance was recovered in full, with a $22.7 billion positive return (US Treasury, December 2012). The taxpayer, the consumer and the saver are one person. Even when a rescue is “repaid,” like AIG’s, the money created around it stays in circulation, and that consumer keeps paying through prices.

No one can know that banks expect to be rescued.

Pegisai does not claim to know any bank’s motive. Pegisai points to the record: regulators rescued banks as too big to fail in 1972, 1974, 1980 and 1984, the Federal Reserve organized the rescue of a giant hedge fund in 1998, and central banks engaged in several other measurable interventions since, in 2008, 2020, 2022 and 2023. Each of these events, the central banks paid for with created money. This conduct erodes the currency’s purchasing power, and to date, this lost purchasing power has never been restored (Cleveland Fed; Federal Reserve History).

This is only a US dollar problem.

No, it is not. Since 1970, the IMF has recorded 151 systemic banking crises around the world, 149 of them outside the United States, each met with significant government and central bank intervention (Laeven and Valencia, IMF Working Paper 18/206, 2018). More have followed since, including Britain in 2022. Each of them eroded the purchasing power of the currency the nation issued, and to date, none of those currencies has recovered from this type of injury.

Reason 4: debasement, wealth and income

The statement

The repeated interventions are now a large share of “inflation.”
The recurring government debt sales / central bank debt purchase cycle is destructive. The cycle debases a nation’s currency, causing inflation, erodes privately held wealth, and harms consumers. By Pegisai’s estimate, currency debasement now accounts for more than 60% of annual inflation and dollar purchasing power has dropped about 39 percent over 20 years.

What this means

When a central bank buys the nation’s own government debt with new money, every unit of the currency already held buys less. The loss is a tax no one voted for.

The logic

The government sells debt.
The nation’s own central bank buys the debt with newly created money in the nation’s own currency.
The new money draws the new money’s value from the money already held.
Everyone holding the currency loses purchasing power: the inflation tax.

The sources and data

Figure	Value	Date	Source
US consumer price inflation	3.4 percent (12 months)	August 2026	BLS
Energy’s share of that inflation	About 1 percentage point (energy prices up 16.3 percent, at about 6.3 percent of the index)	August 2026	BLS
US money supply (M2)	$12.91 trillion to $23.22 trillion, up 79.9 percent	July 2016 to July 2026	Federal Reserve H.6
US real GDP	Up 28.0 percent	Second quarter 2016 to second quarter 2026	BEA
US consumer prices	Up 38.8 percent (not seasonally adjusted); 38.6 percent (seasonally adjusted)	July 2016 to July 2026	BLS
Money held by Americans (M2)	$23.22 trillion	July 2026	Federal Reserve H.6
US dollar purchasing power lost over 20 years	About 39 percent (CPI 203.5 to 333.918; one 2006 dollar buys about 61 cents)	July 2006 to July 2026	BLS

The critic’s questions, answered

Inflation has many causes, not only debasement.

Agreed. Pegisai’s figure is an estimate, and the estimates section of this page shows the method openly: US inflation of 3.4 percent in the year to August 2026, less about 1 percentage point from energy, leaves about 2.4 points, which Pegisai attributes to debasement. The estimate is a method, not a measured split.

Foreign central banks buy US government debt too.

A foreign central bank pays with dollars that already exist, so the foreign purchase creates no new dollars. Only a nation’s own central bank, buying the nation’s own government debt with newly created money in the nation’s own currency, adds new money.

Is the cycle only an American cycle?

No. Britain ran the cycle in 2022, start to finish. The British government’s own debt fell in price after the budget of 23 September 2022. The fall set off collateral calls on pension funds, which could not meet the calls. On 28 September 2022, the Bank of England announced a £65 billion program to buy the government’s debt with newly created money (Bank of England; reported by Reuters).

Not a dollar issue: every currency loses at home

Figure S3. What one unit of each currency buys at home, July 2016 to July 2026. Every line starts at 100. All five currencies lose purchasing power steadily from 2016 to 2020, then fall sharply together in 2021 to 2023, under different governments in different nations. The loss follows the cycle, not any one government. Source: Bank for International Settlements, consumer prices, compiled from national statistics offices; no US figure was published for October 2025.

Currency	Price index, July 2016	Price index, latest	Purchasing power lost
Russian ruble	163.1	301.7 (Jul 2026)	45.9 percent
Brazilian real	151.4	245.9 (Jul 2026)	38.4 percent
Indian rupee	149.6	233.7 (Jul 2026)	36.0 percent
British pound	112.5	159.8 (Jul 2026)	29.6 percent
US dollar	110.4	153.1 (Jul 2026)	27.9 percent
Australian dollar	113.9	153.3 (Jun 2026)	25.7 percent
Euro	107.7	142.7 (Jul 2026)	24.6 percent
Canadian dollar	110.7	145.9 (Jul 2026)	24.1 percent
Japanese yen	103.2	120.4 (Jul 2026)	14.3 percent
Chinese yuan	117.1	133.5 (Jul 2026)	12.2 percent
Swiss franc	97.8	106.4 (Jul 2026)	8.1 percent

Pegisai’s Why the Alkaimi Model Is Better, Part 1, published figures for the same ten years from an earlier data release: the dollar 27.86 percent, the euro 24.51 percent and the yen 14.09 percent; the pound matches at 29.60 percent. The small differences come from the source series used and from later revisions to the price indexes.

Purchasing power lost = 1 − (index July 2016 ÷ index latest). Indexes are the Bank for International Settlements’ consumer price series (2010 = 100), compiled from each nation’s own statistics office.

Bank for International Settlements, consumer prices (long series)

Reason 5: nations’ assets

The statement

The “inflation” and repeated interventions show new tools are needed.
Loss in currency purchasing power, governments as payors of last resort, and the too-big-to-fail arguments all show national governments require the ability to restore balance to their national economic engines. In the existing system, national governments can’t realize their wealth effectively.

What this means

Nations own great real wealth that the nations cannot use without selling the wealth or borrowing against the wealth. Every tool a nation has today forces the nation to give up one goal to reach another.

The logic

Today a nation can turn land, minerals or energy into usable value in only two ways: sell the asset or pledge the asset.
A sale gives up title and ownership; a pledge encumbers the asset and adds new debt.
The United States owns about 640 million acres of land and manages the mineral estate beneath about 700 million acres, and none of that value appears on the Treasury’s liquid asset reserve line.
Today’s tools force a choice: reducing debt slows the economy, stimulating the economy adds debt, and stopping debasement raises interest costs.

The sources and data

Congressional Research Service, Federal Lands and Related Resources: Overview and Selected Issues, R43429

Figure	Value	Date	Source
Surface land owned by the US federal government	About 640 million acres	CRS R43429	CRS
Federal subsurface mineral estate managed by the Bureau of Land Management	About 700 million onshore acres	CRS R43429	CRS

The critic’s questions, answered

A nation can borrow against the nation’s resources.

Borrowing against a resource is a pledge: the resource is encumbered and new debt is added, the opposite of reducing the debt load.

Borrowing against a resource does not step outside the cycle; borrowing restarts the cycle. New debt carries new interest rate and currency risk. That risk is hedged with new derivative contracts, and the contracts are insured with credit default swaps. When the promises fail, the rescue is paid with created money. The cycle is why the promises keep growing: $683.7 trillion in mid-2008 and $844.6 trillion at the end of 2025, even as market value fell. Interest rate contracts, the hedge on borrowing itself, make up 79.3 percent of today’s promises (ISDA, July 2026). ISDA notes that part of the 2025 increase reflects a wider reporting base and the weaker dollar; the long-run climb stands either way.

What Pegisai did to meet the Group’s objectives

1. Invented granular value recognition, creating universal value so any two items achieve parity.

The statement

Invented granular value recognition™, creating universal value so any two items achieve parity.
The Pegisai Group designed, tested and deployed a granular value recognition system which separates asset value from currency pricing. This value recognition method enables the creation of universal value which provides an equal value transfer between any two recognized asset values at parity.

Published in

2. Using our technology, we invented the Digitized Tangible Asset (DTA).

The statement

Using our technology, we invented the Digitized Tangible Asset™ (DTA).
The Pegisai Group designed, tested and implemented a value holding item, The Digitized Tangible Asset which contains Granular Value™ recognized assets in universal value unit which enables this value to be transferred, exchanged and used within the existing global financial system.

Published in

3. Built a walled-garden ecosystem for chartered financial institutions to safely operate the 100% Whole Reserve model.

The statement

Built a walled-garden ecosystem for chartered financial institutions to safely operate the 100% Whole Reserve™ model.
The Pegisai Group designed, tested and implemented a global walled garden network with a centralized ledger which regional chartered financial institutions could exchange value on client’s behalf while also creating liquidity from client’s asset holdings. This system has been named the Alkaimi Ecosystem.

Published in

How the Alkaimi Ecosystem meets the Group’s objectives

1. Member banks create liquidity from recognized value, not from new promises.

The statement

Member banks create liquidity from recognized value, not from new promises.

Published in

2. A recognized asset stays exactly where the asset is.

The statement

A recognized asset stays exactly where the asset is.

What this means

Alkaimi’s value recognition method does not move the asset. Oil stays in the reservoir and ore stays in the mine, and the owner keeps title. Only the recognized value moves.

The logic

Alkaimi’s value recognition method recognizes the value of a segmented, segregated portion of an asset. This avoids the pooling of assets, and aids in the containment of risk, as well as the isolation of value.
The underlying asset remains in place under the custody arrangements that apply to the asset. This avoids unnecessary inventory management costs, risks and contamination of value reserves.
The recognized value is held and moved as DTAs on the Alkaimi ledger. Retention of value within the DTA item, allows immediate settlement upon movement, accurate inventory control, and increases surety in allocated value held at the account level.
Under normal operating conditions, title and ownership of the asset do not change. For conduct during default events, see here.

The sources and data

The critic’s questions, answered

So the assets are locked away in vaults.

No. This is a revolutionary aspect of the system, and of Alkaimi’s value recognition method. In the Alkaimi model, a recognized asset remains at the location of recognition, often held as “in-ground reserves” under the custody arrangements stated in the value recognition agreements that apply to that asset. For more on this, click here.

3. Settlement moves from net debt to gross asset.

The statement

Settlement moves from net debt to gross asset.

Published in

4. The Alkaimi Ecosystem is systemically protective.

The statement

The Alkaimi Ecosystem is systemically protective.

What this means

A settlement on the Alkaimi ledger leaves nothing owed between banks, so there is nothing for a credit default swap to insure. Every position on the Alkaimi ledger is held whole.

The logic

When DTAs move between two member banks, the movement extinguishes the payment obligation.
No claim is left between the banks, so no credit default swap is needed to insure the settlement.
Each DTA stack is underwritten and segregated from every other stack in risk and in lien.
If a DTA issuer defaults, the issuer’s estate is liquidated on the Alkaimi ledger and the underwriter stands as surety.

The sources and data

The critic’s questions, answered

Nothing is risk-free. Who pays when a DTA issuer defaults?

The issuer’s estate is liquidated on the Alkaimi ledger, and the underwriter stands as surety, so the full issued value is designed to be paid to holders.

We’ve been very transparent about risk and the default processes, as well as the containment of default events in comparison to the existing fiat and credit default models:

5. Over time, a member bank’s entire book becomes whole value.

The statement

Over time, a member bank’s entire book becomes whole value.

Published in

6. Member banks settle this way today.

The statement

Member banks settle this way today.

Published in

7. The Alkaimi Ecosystem is a currency-neutral rail.

The statement

The Alkaimi Ecosystem is a currency-neutral rail.

Published in

8. One ledger, inside a walled garden, with no blockchain.

The statement

One ledger, inside a walled garden, with no blockchain.

Published in

Pegisai Global Holdings, release, 1 October 2026

9. The DTA is not a cryptocurrency, and the Alkaimi Ecosystem is not a crypto network.

The statement

The DTA is not a cryptocurrency, and the Alkaimi Ecosystem is not a crypto network.

What this means

The DTA shares nothing with a cryptocurrency but the fact that the DTA is recorded digitally. The value comes first, from a real asset, and the DTA is a claim on no one.

The logic

The Alkaimi ledger is one ledger, with no blockchain and no distributed ledger.
Every client reaches the Alkaimi ledger only through a licensed member bank.
A DTA is not created by fiat: the value exists first, in the client’s own tangible asset.
A DTA is digital in form and tangible in value, and a claim on no one.

The sources and data

The critic’s questions, answered

This is crypto with a banking label.

No, not at any level. Our design team for nearly five years listened to this type of commentary, and the company has spent nearly half a decade educating people what first generation digitals (our internal term for cryptocurrencies, stable coins, tokenized deposits and most NFTs) are.

10. Every member bank works inside existing law, under the bank’s own regulator.

The statement

Every member bank works inside existing law, under the bank’s own regulator.

What this means

The model runs inside the banking law that already exists. Each member bank is a chartered bank, supervised by the bank’s own regulator.

The logic

Each member bank is chartered under the bank’s nation’s banking law.
Each member bank is licensed to operate the model.
Supervisory classification of member operations rests with each member’s own regulator.
Pegisai does not provide banking services, accept deposits, hold client value or execute client settlements.

The sources and data

The critic’s questions, answered

Has a regulator approved this?

No central bank, supervisor, government or other authority has reviewed, approved or endorsed Alkaimi, the Alkaimi Ecosystem, the Alkaimi platform, any member financial institution’s participation in it, or this site.

Generally speaking, most member banks’ existing charters cover these described operations, and the licensee can run the model immediately. In some jurisdictions, local regulators expect a notice before licensed operations begin. In every case, notice and operation are the duty of each licensee, as is compliance with all regional regulatory requirements the licensee’s charter and laws require.

For more on these types of operations:

For more:

Is value held on the Alkaimi ledger a deposit, and is the value insured?

Held value is not a currency deposit and is not insured by deposit insurance or by a government agency such as the FDIC. Value held on the ecosystem’s ledger is held under a custodial agreement, and the settlement mechanisms used in the licensed model are themselves individually insured.

11. Seventeen asset classes today, with more ready to follow.

The statement

Seventeen asset classes today, with more ready to follow.

Published in

Pegisai Global Holdings, release, 1 October 2026

12. The Alkaimi platform is built to scale.

The statement

The Alkaimi platform is built to scale.

Published in

13. Consumer services come later, by the members’ common decision.

The statement

Consumer services come later, by the members’ common decision.

Published in

14. Governments can engage a member financial institution today.

The statement

Governments can engage a member financial institution today.

Published in

Alkaimi Ecosystem, Qualify

Why the Alkaimi model meets the Group’s objectives

1. Banks settle with value, not promises.

The statement

Banks settle with value, not promises.

Published in

Pegisai Global Holdings, Operational Capabilities of the Alkaimi Ecosystem, 5 October 2026

2. A licensed member bank stops creating money.

The statement

A licensed member bank stops creating money.

What this means

Today a bank creates new money every time the bank makes a loan. Under the 100% Whole Reserve model, a member bank holds the client’s value whole and lends none of the client’s value.

The logic

When a bank makes a loan today, the bank creates a new deposit: new money (Bank of England, 2014).
Under the 100% Whole Reserve model, no licensed member bank lends against a client’s value.
The client’s value stays the client’s, held whole in the bank’s custody.
With no loan made against the client’s value, no new deposit, and no new promise, is created.

The sources and data

Bank of England, “Money creation in the modern economy,” Quarterly Bulletin, 2014
Pegisai, The 100% Whole Reserve Model
George Selgin, Less Than Zero: The Case for a Falling Price Level in a Growing Economy, Institute of Economic Affairs, Hobart Paper 132, 1997
Milton Friedman, “The Optimum Quantity of Money,” 1969
Michael Bordo and Andrew Filardo, “Deflation in a historical perspective,” BIS Working Paper 186, 2005
Claudio Borio, Magdalena Erdem, Andrew Filardo and Boris Hofmann, “The costs of deflations: a historical perspective,” BIS Quarterly Review, March 2015
Irving Fisher, “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica, volume 1, issue 4, October 1933, pages 337 to 357

The critic’s questions, answered

Without banks creating money, lending stops.

Sorry, but that isn’t correct. First, your statement is that banks stop lending money. That’s incorrect. And second, you allege our model stops lending. That’s untrue as well. Factually, our model can create more liquidity, and do so with less risk and without inflating the currency the way bank lending does today.

A central bank advancing currency against DTAs is just printing money.

An advance against pledged DTAs does create central bank money at the moment of the advance. The difference is what the advance replaces, and who controls it. A loan funded from an advance creates no deposit, and the deposits old loans created run off as those loans repay. New money enters only as old money retires, in amounts the central bank sets itself, against recognized real value instead of the government’s own debt. That is management of the money supply, not expansion of it.

The model gives a central bank three tools it doesn’t have today: control of volume, set against run-off; real collateral, so the central bank no longer has to buy its own government’s debt to supply money; and a policy rate that works on pledged real value.

With those tools, a central bank could hold its currency’s purchasing power steady, or let prices fall gently as productivity grows. Economists have long made the case that a gently falling price level in a growing economy is healthy, not dangerous (Selgin, 1997; Friedman, 1969; Bordo and Filardo, 2005; Borio and others, BIS, 2015).

The danger economists warn about is debt-deflation: prices falling fast while debts stay fixed (Fisher, 1933). The Alkaimi Ecosystem is designed to reach its scale at a controlled pace across approximately a decade, so debts are not stranded, and Alkaimi’s member institutions do so in collaboration with their regional central banks. This assists more than just one central bank in the management of each central bank’s own books.

3. The old promises are retired.

The statement

The old promises are retired.

Published in

4. New lending is designed to be funded by real value.

The statement

New lending is designed to be funded by real value.

Published in

5. Value held as DTAs keeps purchasing power.

The statement

Value held as DTAs keeps purchasing power.

Published in

6. The Alkaimi Ecosystem is a currency-neutral rail.

The statement

The Alkaimi Ecosystem is a currency-neutral rail.

Published in

Pegisai Global Holdings, Operational Capabilities of the Alkaimi Ecosystem, 5 October 2026

7. Governments no longer have to create debt to grow or to rescue.

The statement

Governments no longer have to create debt to grow or to rescue.

What this means

Today a government that needs money to grow or to rescue must borrow the money. The model is designed to let a nation use the recognized value of the nation’s own assets instead.

The logic

A nation’s assets can be recognized while the assets stay within the nation’s borders, with no change in title or ownership.
The recognized value can fund economic expansion or buy back existing debt.
The Alkaimi Ecosystem’s operating guidelines permit a nation’s recognized asset reserves to be used only for economic expansion or debt reduction.
No new bonds are sold for a central bank to buy with new money.

The sources and data

Pegisai, The Platform
Pegisai Global Holdings, Operational Capabilities of the Alkaimi Ecosystem, 5 October 2026
James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, Academic Press, 1977 (Liberty Fund edition, chapter 8)
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, fiscal policy guidelines of 2001 and the revision of the expected real return to 3 percent
Congressional Budget Office, net interest outlays, fiscal year 2026; US Treasury, average interest rates on marketable debt, January 2026

The critic’s questions, answered

A government will simply borrow anyway.

While few people can predict what any government may or may not do, we disagree with you. The model provides a more efficient way to reduce debts, liabilities and fund economic expansion projects at a national level.

Start with the cost. The United States pays about $1 trillion a year in interest alone (Congressional Budget Office, fiscal year 2026), at an average rate of 3.348 percent on its marketable debt (US Treasury, January 2026). Each $1 trillion of debt bought back with recognized national value removes about $33.5 billion a year of interest ($1 trillion × 3.348 percent; Pegisai arithmetic).

While governments may still borrow, the amount they borrow could be reduced by the amount of interest costs removed from their budgets, and the remaining disposable tax revenues could be more efficiently managed. Debt bought back with recognized value puts no new bonds in front of a central bank, so the debasement cycle in reason 4 does not run. The nation keeps title and ownership, and the asset stays where the asset is. The operating guidelines limit recognized national reserves to economic expansion or debt reduction.

Politically speaking, it seems logical that any elected official who can provide essential services while benefiting economic growth and reducing spending is incentivized to take that option. No one likes taxes. The economists James Buchanan and Richard Wagner showed why governments borrow: voters feel taxes at once, so elected officials prefer deficits. When a central bank funds the deficit with new money, the inflation that follows is simply another form of tax (Buchanan and Wagner, Democracy in Deficit, 1977; Buchanan received the Nobel prize in economics in 1986).

Norway shows a nation funding public services from the value of its resources. Since 2001, Norway’s fiscal rule has transferred to the national budget an amount matching the expected real return on the nation’s oil fund, now set at 3 percent (Norwegian Ministry of Finance). Norway had to sell its oil to build that fund. The Alkaimi model leaves the asset in place.

What politician doesn’t get elected, or re-elected, for providing taxpayers more realized income, increasing the purchasing power of the nation’s currency, and doing so while reducing government debt and spending?

8. Economic stress no longer shifts from too-big-to-fail banks onto the taxpayer.

The statement

Economic stress no longer shifts from too-big-to-fail banks onto the taxpayer.

What this means

A rescue is needed when a bank owes promises the bank cannot keep. Value held whole on the Alkaimi ledger is not a promise, so there is nothing on that ledger to rescue.

The logic

Rescues have recurred for more than fifty years, each paid by the public (see reason 3).
On value held on the Alkaimi ledger, a member bank holds the client’s value instead of owing a promise.
Settlement between member banks is final when the value moves, so no chain of promises carries one bank’s failure to the next.
With no promise to rescue on the Alkaimi ledger, no rescue lands on the taxpayer for that value.

The sources and data

The critic’s questions, answered

A member bank can still fail.

While any mismanaged bank can fail, the Alkaimi model reduces the incidents that cause a failure, and can over time eliminate the reasons behind cascading bank failures. Banks fail, and failures spread, for a few known reasons. The model addresses each one:

Runs: a run happens when depositors fear a bank cannot pay its currency promises: $42 billion left Silicon Valley Bank in one day in March 2023. Value held whole in custody is not a promise, so the value cannot be run.
Contagion between banks: a failure spreads through the claims banks owe one another. A settlement on the Alkaimi ledger leaves no claim between the banks, so one bank’s failure has no unpaid claim to travel through.
The hedges that fail with the banks: with no claim left by settlement, no credit default swap is needed to insure the settlement, so no protection seller fails alongside the bank it insured, as AIG did in 2008.
Losses that spread: a default stays inside that one DTA stack, reaching only the custodial accounts that hold the stack’s DTAs, in whichever member banks hold them. Each holder is made whole in that account, and no member bank carries the loss.
Lending losses: on lending funded from rented DTAs, the bank’s own DTAs absorb losses first, the currency line is drawn below the value of the pledged reserve, and the DTA owner’s principal never enters the lending book.

What happens when a DTA stack defaults:

	The old system: a borrower defaults	The Alkaimi Ecosystem: a stack’s issuer defaults
Who pays first	The lending bank’s capital	The defaulting issuer’s own estate
Who makes the holder whole	A deposit insurer or a government, after failure	The underwriter as surety, to the full issued value
What the bank loses	The loan, which can sink the bank	Nothing: the value is not on the bank’s books
How the loss spreads	Through interbank claims and the swaps that insured them	No claims left, no swaps needed
Who pays in the end	Taxpayers and currency holders	The defaulter, then the underwriter, who holds the asset

As more value moves onto the Alkaimi ledger, less of the banking system is exposed to the causes that turn one failure into many.

9. Private asset holders and income earners gain a more balanced system to use and grow from.

The statement

Private asset holders and income earners gain a more balanced system to use and grow from.

Published in

Who benefits from the Pegisai Group’s objectives

Who benefits

The statement

Regional banks, central banks, treasuries, businesses, asset holders and the people the banks serve.

Published in

The question

The promises grow with the debt: $683.7 trillion in mid-2008, $844.6 trillion at the end of 2025, whatever market value does (reason 1).
Each rescue is paid by taking purchasing power from the currency, and every major currency fell together from 2016 to 2026 (reason 4).
Even the experts’ own measure of the promises grows when a currency weakens: ISDA reports that the weaker dollar raised the reported value of the promises in 2025 (ISDA, July 2026).

At what point do the experts accept what Pegisai realized about the old system, and when does removing purchasing power from currencies, eroding private holders’ wealth and their retained value, become the wrong answer?

Pegisai estimates and arithmetic

These figures are Pegisai’s own estimates or arithmetic on the published data above. Each figure shows the figure’s inputs, so any reader can work the numbers.

Figure	Value	Basis	Inputs and arithmetic
Promises (notional amount) against all official reserves	About 44 times	Pegisai arithmetic	$844.6 trillion ÷ $19.2 trillion = 44
Government debt against all official reserves	About 5 times	Pegisai arithmetic	$99 trillion ÷ $19.2 trillion = 5.2
US dollar debasement’s share of inflation	About 70 percent, roughly 2.4 percentage points	Pegisai estimate	3.4 percent inflation less about 1 percentage point from energy = 2.4 points; 2.4 ÷ 3.4 = 70 percent
Annual loss of purchasing power on money held	About $790 billion	Pegisai arithmetic	$23.22 trillion × 3.4 percent = $789 billion
Share of that loss from debasement	About $550 billion	Pegisai estimate	$789 billion × 70 percent = $553 billion
One 2008 dollar today	About 64 cents	Pegisai arithmetic on BLS data	215.303 ÷ 333.918 = 0.645
One dollar since August 1971	About 12 cents	Pegisai arithmetic on BLS data	40.8 ÷ 333.918 = 0.122
Viable reserves outside the existing financial system	More than $4 quadrillion	Pegisai estimate	Earth’s natural infrastructure is valued at about $33 quadrillion (Environmental Business International, 2020): $4 quadrillion ÷ $33 quadrillion = 12 percent. Pegisai counts an asset as viable only when a market for the asset exists, demand for the asset will exist and value must be created for the asset to transact, and only after weighing the asset’s quality and the stability of the nation in which the asset sits. The $33 quadrillion is a stock of assets. Nature’s services of $125 trillion to $145 trillion a year (Costanza and others, 2014) are a yearly flow and are not added. The estimate measures scale only: no value enters the Alkaimi ledger until a member bank puts a specific asset through Alkaimi’s value recognition method and an underwriter warrants the asset.
Nations above 100 percent debt to GDP for five years or more, since 1972	46 episodes in 42 nations; 29 returns below 100 percent, 28 of them through debt relief, default, high inflation, a bailout or a windfall, or not held, with Comoros the exception; 15 nations still above 100 percent	Pegisai analysis of IMF data	General government gross debt as a percent of GDP, by nation, from the IMF Public Finances in Modern History Database (December 2025, through 2024), with the years the database lacks, and 2025 and 2026, from the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2026). An episode starts in 1972 or later, in the first year debt rises above 100 percent, and ends in the first year debt is back below 100 percent. Of 126 episodes, 46 lasted five years or more. Each ended episode was checked for debt forgiveness, default or restructuring, average consumer-price inflation above 10 percent a year across the episode (World Economic Outlook, from 1980), an outside bailout, a resource windfall, and a later return above 100 percent (not held). Barbados is back below 100 percent in the IMF’s 2025 estimate. Spain and Cabo Verde are below 100 percent only in the IMF’s 2026 projections and are not counted as returns. The latest IMF figure for Eritrea is for 2019, and for Lebanon and Venezuela for 2025. Every episode is listed below.

Debt past 100 percent of GDP since 1972: the 46 episodes

Each row is one episode in which a nation’s government debt stood above 100 percent of GDP for five years or more, starting in 1972 or later. The method is set out in the table above.

Returned below 100 percent: 29 episodes

Nation	Years above 100 percent	Peak, percent of GDP (year)	How the return came about	Sources
Barbados	2012 to 2024	143 (2017)	Default and debt restructuring, 2018, with an IMF program; below 100 percent in the IMF’s 2025 estimate	IMF, press release 18/370, 1 October 2018
Belgium	1983 to 2003	139 (1993)	Not held: above 100 percent again from 2010	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Belgium	2010 to 2017	107 (2014)	Not held: above 100 percent again from 2020	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Bolivia	1980 to 1988	205 (1985)	Inflation averaging 1,534.8 percent a year	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Burundi	1993 to 2008	173 (2004)	HIPC debt relief; inflation averaging 13.6 percent a year	IMF, HIPC Initiative factsheet
Comoros	1984 to 1992	150 (1984)	The exception: debt fell steadily across nine years, with inflation averaging 0.5 percent a year and no Paris Club treatment before 2009	Paris Club, Comoros; IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	2000 to 2006	185 (2001)	Inflation averaging 140.5 percent a year; HIPC debt relief	IMF, HIPC Initiative factsheet; IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Congo, Republic of	1989 to 2004	231 (1994)	Debt forgiveness: Paris Club, December 2004, canceled $1.68 billion of $3.0 billion treated (67 percent); oil export revenue rose in 2005	Paris Club, Congo, 16 December 2004; IMF, PIN 07/47
Equatorial Guinea	1980 to 1995	261 (1982)	Resource windfall: major oil fields in production from 1996; Paris Club, 1994, 50 percent cancellation	IMF, PN 99/86; Paris Club, 15 December 1994
Guinea-Bissau	1993 to 2009	217 (2000)	HIPC debt relief; inflation averaging 14.5 percent a year	IMF, HIPC Initiative factsheet
Iceland	2008 to 2014	138 (2011)	Outside bailout: IMF Stand-By Arrangement, November 2008; stability contributions from the estates of the failed banks, 2016	IMF, press release 08/296; Statistics Iceland, 15 March 2017
Israel	1977 to 1996	284 (1984)	Inflation averaging 92.6 percent a year	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Jamaica	2001 to 2017	147 (2012)	Debt restructuring: debt exchanges in 2010 and 2013, with an IMF program from 2013	Government of Jamaica, SEC filing, 2018; IMF, press release 13/150
Jordan	1987 to 1999	228 (1990)	Debt restructuring: Paris Club reschedulings, 1989 to 1999; commercial bank debt deal on Brady terms, 1993	Paris Club, Jordan; MEES, 1993
Kyrgyz Republic	1999 to 2003	123 (2000)	Paris Club treatment, 2002; inflation averaging 13.5 percent a year	Paris Club, 7 March 2002; IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Liberia	2000 to 2009	600 (2003)	HIPC debt relief	IMF, HIPC Initiative factsheet
Madagascar	1987 to 1993	128 (1987)	Inflation averaging 13.7 percent a year	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Myanmar	1998 to 2006	262 (2001)	Inflation averaging 17.7 percent a year	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Nauru	2009 to 2015	299 (2010)	Default: government-guaranteed yen bonds in default since the 1990s and settled in 2021; revenue from Australia’s regional processing center from 2012	IMF, Country Report 17/82; Nauru Debt Report 2021
Nicaragua	1979 to 1996	267 (1987)	Inflation averaging 1,777.3 percent a year	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Portugal	2010 to 2022	134 (2020)	Outside bailout: €78 billion EU and IMF program, 2011; in 2023, nominal GDP growth, mainly from inflation, supplied 7.6 of the 13.3 points by which the debt ratio fell	European Commission, financial assistance to Portugal; Portuguese Public Finance Council, 2023 outturn
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2001 to 2012	153 (2004)	Debt restructuring: debt exchange and debt-for-land swap, 2012; Paris Club, 2012; IMF program, 2011	Paris Club, 24 May 2012; IMF, press release 12/228
Seychelles	1994 to 2009	200 (2001)	Debt forgiveness: Paris Club, 2009, 45 percent cancellation; private creditor debt exchange, 2010; IMF program, 2008	Paris Club, April 2009; IMF, press release 10/269
Spain	2013 to 2017	104 (2014)	Not held: above 100 percent again from 2020	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Sudan	1992 to 2003	495 (1992)	Inflation averaging 51.4 percent a year; not held: above 100 percent again from 2016	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Syria	1990 to 2004	190 (1990)	Debt forgiveness: Russia wrote off 73 percent ($9.8 billion) of Syria’s Soviet-era debt, 2005	GTR, 7 February 2005
São Tomé and Príncipe	2001 to 2007	418 (2001)	HIPC debt relief; inflation averaging 14.5 percent a year	IMF, HIPC Initiative factsheet
Tanzania	1991 to 1995	129 (1993)	Inflation averaging 27.3 percent a year	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Zambia	2000 to 2004	261 (2000)	HIPC debt relief; inflation averaging 21.4 percent a year	IMF, HIPC Initiative factsheet

Below 100 percent only in projections: 2 episodes

Nation	Years above 100 percent	Peak, percent of GDP (year)	Status	Sources
Cabo Verde	2014 to 2025	149 (2021)	Below 100 percent only in the IMF’s 2026 projection	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Spain	2020 to 2025	119 (2020)	Below 100 percent only in the IMF’s 2026 projection	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook

Still above 100 percent: 15 nations

Nation	Years above 100 percent	Peak, percent of GDP (year)	Latest figure	Sources
Bahrain	2020 to 2026	152 (2026)	152 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Belgium	2020 to 2026	111 (2020)	109 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Bhutan	2020 to 2026	123 (2021)	120 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Canada	2020 to 2026	118 (2020)	111 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Eritrea	2000 to 2019	290 (2017)	260 percent in 2019 (latest IMF figure)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
France	2020 to 2026	118 (2026)	118 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Greece	1995 to 2026	210 (2020)	137 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Italy	1992 to 2026	154 (2020)	138 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Japan	1997 to 2026	258 (2020)	204 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Lebanon	1996 to 2025	361 (2021)	139 percent in 2025 (IMF estimate)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Maldives	2020 to 2026	156 (2020)	129 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Singapore	2015 to 2026	172 (2026)	172 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Sudan	2016 to 2026	278 (2020)	169 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
United States	2011 to 2026	133 (2020)	126 percent in 2026 (IMF projection)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook
Venezuela	2015 to 2025	337 (2020)	309 percent in 2025 (IMF estimate)	IMF, Public Finances in Modern History; IMF, World Economic Outlook

Back to Pegisai at a Glance

Pegisai Global Holdings develops, licenses and administers the technology supporting the Alkaimi Financial Ecosystem. Pegisai does not provide banking services, accept deposits, hold client value or execute client settlements. Banking operations are conducted by member chartered financial institutions.

Value held on the ecosystem’s ledger is held under a custodial agreement. Held value is not a currency deposit and is not insured by deposit insurance or by a government agency such as the FDIC. The settlement mechanisms used in the licensed model are themselves individually insured.

Supervisory classification of member operations rests with each member’s own regulator. The Alkaimi Ecosystem has not been designated a systemically important financial market utility.

This page contains some forward-looking statements. Read Pegisai’s statement on forward-looking statements.