ACVI and AGSI Explained

The Alkaimi Currency Value Index™ (ACVI™) and the Alkaimi Government Solvency Index™ (AGSI™) are two rating indexes published by the Pegisai group. This page explains what they measure and why; the report and the review that follow on this page carry the September 2026 readings for twenty currencies. Every formula is given here in full, every input is drawn from a named public source, and any reader can rerun the arithmetic.

1. A currency is a promise, and money is something else

A currency is a promise made by a state, a bank deposit is a promise made by a bank, and neither is the value itself. On every central bank's balance sheet the notes and reserves it has issued sit on the liability side, as what the bank owes, and on every commercial bank's balance sheet a deposit sits the same way. Part 1 of the story in four parts on this site sets out why the two promises are different things and why the world has come to use one word for both. This page takes that distinction as given and asks the next question: what stands behind the state's promise, and who is managing it.

2. A currency's price carries two kinds of value

Every currency's price is made of two things: the value of what the state holds in its own name behind its promise, and the value the promise carries because others must accept it. The first is intrinsic. The intrinsic value is the state's gold, its sovereign funds, its enterprises, its reserves in the ground, its land and its infrastructure, set against everything the state owes. The second is extrinsic. The extrinsic value is the demand for the currency that exists because of the state's military reach, because other central banks hold the currency as a reserve, because the rails of settlement run in it, because oil and metals are invoiced in it, and because the capital markets issue in it. Intrinsic value belongs to the state and is spent only by the state. Extrinsic value is granted by others, and the parties that grant it can withdraw it.

3. So a currency is an investment, and a government is its manager

Whoever holds a currency has lent to the state that issues it, and an investor asks two questions of any borrower: what stands behind the promise, and who is managing it. A central bank holding another state's currency as a reserve, a company holding working balances, a family holding savings: each is a creditor of the issuing state. The ACVI answers the second question, how the state is run as the manager of what stands behind its currency. The AGSI answers the first, how far what the state owns covers what it owes and how much of the currency's price is the state's own. Neither is a forecast, a price or an opinion. Each is arithmetic on public data, applied to every sovereign at the same standard.

4. The Alkaimi Currency Value Index grades the manager

The ACVI grades the government behind a currency, from 0 to 100, on seven counts of conduct: how it borrows, how it issues, whether it has kept its word, what it holds against what it owes, whether it can pay for its army from its own output, how it takes from its citizens, and whether it has seized from them. Each count is a factor between 0 and 1, and the seven are multiplied.

ACVI = 100 × F_fiscal × F_monetary × F_settlement × F_coverage × F_military × F_tax × F_bailin

The index treats a currency as equity in the state that issues it: the currency outstanding is the share float, output is earnings capacity, debt is leverage, asset coverage is the balance sheet, settlement history is management credibility, and tax architecture is governance. The one question the index asks is what the currency is worth when the requirement to use it no longer exists. Every conventional framework counts compulsion as value; the ACVI removes it.

4.1 Fiscal discipline

F_fiscal = [1 − min(Debt/GDP ÷ 1.5, 0.90)] × [1 − min(Deficit/GDP, 0.30)], floor 0.10

The first term is the stock of debt against a year's output, the second is the flow, whether the state is adding to the stock or reducing it. At 40 percent of GDP the debt term is 0.733, at 90 percent 0.400, at 120 percent 0.200, and at 150 percent and above it rests on its floor of 0.100; a deficit of 5 percent of GDP takes a further 5 percent from the factor. The 1.5 divisor sets 150 percent of GDP as the level above which no fiscal adjustment closes the gap within a political horizon. The floor keeps fiscal impairment alone from collapsing the score, so that the terminal failures are the ones the other factors are built to catch.

The theory is the history of sovereign borrowing. Reinhart and Rogoff's study of eight centuries of default (This Time Is Different, 2009) finds that states default at very different debt levels, and that the states with a history of default lose the market's tolerance at ratios far below those the largest borrowers carry; the debt term scores the stock, and the settlement factor below scores the history. Debt sustainability analysis as the IMF practices it asks the same two questions, the stock and the primary balance, and the ACVI asks them of every sovereign at one scale.

4.2 Monetary solvency

F_monetary = [1 − min((M2/Real GDP − 0.50) ÷ 2.0, 0.85)] × [1 − min(M2 growth − Real GDP growth, 0.25)], floor 0.15

The first term is the stock of money against a year's real output: below 50 percent the term is 1.00, at 100 percent 0.75, at 200 percent 0.50, and near 250 percent it rests at its floor. The second term is the growth gap, the rate at which money grows faster than real output, penalized directly and capped at 25 points. Real output is used throughout and nominal output never, because a state that expands its money supply raises nominal output by raising prices, and a ratio of money to nominal output would show the debasement as growth. The growth gap is the index's debasement detector: a state inflating its way through a fiscal problem shows money growing faster than real output whatever the nominal accounts report.

The theory is the quantity theory of money. Fisher (The Purchasing Power of Money, 1911) wrote the identity: the money stock times the rate at which it turns over equals the price level times real transactions. Friedman (1963) drew the consequence, that a sustained rise in prices is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, a faster growth of money than of output. The first term of the factor is the inverse of Fisher's velocity, the second is Friedman's gap.

4.3 Settlement integrity

F_settlement: categorical, 1.00 to 0.10, with a further −0.10 to −0.15 for systemic manipulation

The scale scores the record of honoring monetary obligations. 1.00: no default, full convertibility always maintained. 0.87: minor credibility events, IMF programs, managed devaluations, exits from exchange rate arrangements. 0.75: unilateral restructuring of monetary obligations, convertibility restrictions, or the use of settlement infrastructure as a sanction. 0.60: technical or selective default, a haircut on private creditors with the central bank's involvement, or a bail-in of senior creditors. 0.45: formal default on obligations in the state's own currency. 0.25: repeated default. 0.10: hyperinflationary destruction of the currency. Where a state has restructured the conditions under which its currency circulates for foreign holders without their consent, conscripting them into financing the state's debt through regulation, a further 0.10 to 0.15 comes off the base.

Systemic manipulation is scored above an equivalent direct default because a default tells the holder to leave and manipulation does not. The theory of the first part is Reinhart and Rogoff's finding that default is serial: a state that has defaulted is more likely to default again, and the record is the best predictor the holder has. The theory of the second part is Farrell and Newman's account of weaponized interdependence (International Security, 2019): a state at the center of the settlement network can turn the network into leverage over every participant, and a currency whose rails are used that way carries a cost the holder cannot see in the exchange rate. The closure of the dollar's gold window in August 1971 is scored on the first part; the use of the dollar's settlement infrastructure as a sanction is scored on the second.

4.4 Asset coverage

F_coverage = min(Verified hard assets ÷ M2, 1.00)^0.5, floor 0.05

Verified hard assets are the central bank's gold at the Universal Value Average price rather than at spot, independently audited sovereign tangible assets, sovereign wealth fund assets at a 30 percent discount, and state-owned reserves in the ground at a 50 percent discount. Foreign exchange reserves are not hard assets, because they are another state's promise. The ratio is taken to the square root: at 10 percent coverage the factor is 0.316, at 25 percent 0.500, at 50 percent 0.707, at 100 percent 1.000. The square root states that soundness has diminishing returns to coverage; the difference between no cover and a quarter cover matters more to a holder than the difference between half cover and full. Gold is priced at the Universal Value Average because the spot price carries the same debasement premium the factor is measuring, and pricing the cover in the thing being measured would inflate the cover.

The theory is the oldest in banking: a promise is sound to the extent of the assets behind it, and the reserve ratio was the measure of a bank's soundness for as long as banks issued notes. The gold standard applied the same measure to the state until 1971, when the dollar's cover ended. The ACVI restores the measure and applies it to the money stock as it is today.

4.5 Military sustainability

F_military = F_capability × F_sustainability

F_sustainability = 1 − min(Defense/GDP ÷ 0.10, 0.50) × (1 − F_fiscal) × (1 − F_monetary)

The factor asks whether the state can fund its military from its own productive output without destroying its currency. A state spending heavily on defense while fiscally and monetarily impaired is funding projection with borrowed or printed money, and the sustainability term compounds the two impairments against the spending share. Alliances, reserve currency subsidy and geopolitical standing are excluded. Capability is a normalized index of active personnel, naval tonnage, air assets, nuclear status and projection reach; in the September 2026 readings it is carried at 1.00 for every assessed sovereign, so that the factor reads sustainability alone until a published scale is adopted, and that convention is stated in the report.

The theory is Kennedy's (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 1987): great powers have fallen when military commitments outran the productive base that paid for them, and the currency has been the first casualty of the gap. A large military funded from a sound fiscal and monetary base is a durable asset; the same military funded from debasement is a contingent one.

4.6 Revenue extraction architecture

F_tax: categorical, 1.00 to 0.20

The scale scores how far the state's revenue is drawn from participants in ways they cannot avoid. 1.00: direct taxation on productive activity only, income, corporate and royalty taxes that a participant can reduce by producing less. 0.85: a mixed system with a value added tax below 10 percent. 0.70: a value added tax of 10 to 20 percent applied broadly. 0.55: a value added tax above 20 percent as the primary revenue source. 0.40: value added tax with financial transaction taxes, capital controls and mandatory savings schemes that direct citizens' capital into the state's obligations. 0.20: every dimension of economic activity subject to extraction. Consumption tax is scored as extraction because no participant can avoid consuming, so the tax reaches the participant regardless of income or productive contribution.

The theory is financial repression. Reinhart and Sbrancia (The Liquidation of Government Debt, NBER 2011) document how states after 1945 reduced their debt by channeling citizens' savings into government paper at rates below inflation, through captive institutions, capital controls and directed credit, and how that channel liquidated debt at the saver's expense without any visible default. The lower rungs of the scale are that machinery, and the factor scores a state's reliance on it.

4.7 Citizen asset seizure

F_bailin: categorical, 1.00 to 0.20

The scale scores whether the state has built or used a legal mechanism to reach into private accounts and assets to settle its own obligations. 1.00: no mechanism, no precedent, property protections robust and enforced. 0.85: a framework in law never exercised. 0.70: exercised on subordinated creditors only; the Cyprus precedent of 2013 sits here. 0.55: exercised on senior creditors or large depositors. 0.40: an active architecture with deposit insurance limits inadequate to typical balances. 0.20: an outright historical seizure of citizen assets, forced gold confiscation, or the mandatory exchange of private assets for state paper; the dollar's seizure of 1933 sits here. The precedent matters independently of the probability: a state that has shown the will to reach into private accounts is a different creditor risk from a state that has not.

The law behind the scale is public. The Financial Stability Board's Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes (October 2011) made bail-in the international standard for resolving banks; the European Union's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU) made it the primary tool in Europe; Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act carries the same authority in the United States. The theory is the one North set out (Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990): the security of property against the state is the institution on which every other economic promise rests, and a state that has breached it once has repriced every promise it makes.

4.8 Why the seven multiply

The seven factors are multiplied, not added, because each is independently necessary. An additive index would let strong asset coverage offset a record of seizing deposits, or a sound fiscal position offset hyperinflation, and would produce a middling score for a state that has done a terminal thing. A product does not: when any one factor approaches zero the whole score approaches zero, whatever the other six read. A state that has destroyed its currency is not a sound issuer because it holds gold, and a state that has confiscated its citizens' accounts is not a sound issuer because its budget balances. The floors on the fiscal, monetary and coverage factors keep a single impairment from collapsing the score by itself, so that collapse is reserved for the conduct that deserves it.

5. The Alkaimi Government Solvency Index grades the balance sheet and the promise

The AGSI asks two things of a currency: how far what the state owns covers what the state owes, and how much of the currency's price is the state's own rather than granted by others. It produces a score from minus 10 to plus 10 with a bail-in flag and a trajectory beside it. The ACVI asks how well the state is run; the AGSI asks how much of the currency's observed value is real. A state can score well on the first and poorly on the second when its currency's price rests on reserve status and settlement control rather than on what the state owns.

5.1 The Extrinsic Dependency Ratio

EDR = E_military + E_reserve + E_settlement + E_commodity + E_access, bounded 0 to 0.95

F_intrinsic = 1 − EDR

The ratio quantifies the compulsion priced into a currency's exchange value, in five components, each a share of a global total times a coefficient: the state's share of world defense spending times 0.35; the currency's share of allocated official reserves times 0.30; its share of settlement messaging times 0.25; its share of commodity invoicing times 0.20; its share of capital market issuance times 0.15. The ratio is bounded at 0.95 because no currency is wholly extrinsic; even the most compulsion-dependent currency retains some voluntary use. What remains after the extrinsic share is removed is the intrinsic share, F_intrinsic.

The theory is the literature on the reserve currency's privilege. Triffin (Gold and the Dollar Crisis, 1960) showed that a national currency serving as the world's reserve must be supplied through the issuer's deficits, and that the supply undermines the confidence on which the role depends. Gourinchas and Rey (From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist, 2007) measured the return the issuer earns on the difference between what it borrows cheaply from the world and what it earns on its assets abroad. Eichengreen (Exorbitant Privilege, 2011) traced the history of that privilege and its conditions. The five components are the channels those authors identified, measured from the sources they used: the IMF's reserve composition data, the settlement network's messaging shares, and the defense and issuance statistics.

5.2 Government Productive Assets

GPA = CBH + (SWF × 0.70) + SOE + IGR + SRP + (TIF × 0.60)

The GPA is everything the state holds in its own name or through wholly owned entities, marked at what a creditor could recover under distressed disposal rather than at what it would fetch in an orderly market. CBH is the central bank's holdings: gold at the Universal Value Average price, foreign exchange reserves at face, the IMF position and special drawing rights at published value. SWF is sovereign wealth fund assets at 70 percent. SOE is the state's equity in its enterprises at a distressed discount, 35 percent off for listed and 50 percent off for unlisted. IGR is reserves in the ground: hydrocarbons at 50 percent, minerals at 40 percent, on three tracks, conventional, stranded at zero, and recognized under Alkaimi™'s value recognition method at 25 to 30 percent. SRP is sovereign real property at forced-sale value, with military installations at land value only. TIF is transport, spectrum and water infrastructure at 60 percent of going-concern value. Assets reachable only by confiscating private wealth are excluded under every weighting; the citizens' assets are not the state's.

The precedent for measuring the state this way is the IMF's own. The Fiscal Monitor of October 2018, Managing Public Wealth, built a public sector balance sheet for 31 countries covering 61 percent of world output and found public assets of 101 trillion dollars, 219 percent of GDP, against liabilities of 198 percent of GDP including 46 percent of accrued pensions. The Fund argued that debt and deficits alone give an incomplete picture and that the balance sheet, what the state owns against what it owes, is the complete one. The AGSI adopts that frame, marks the assets at recovery rather than book, and adds the one liability absent from the Fund's balance sheet.

5.3 Total Sovereign Obligations

TSO = SD + M2 + (UO × PV_factor × 0.70) + (CL × 0.40)

The TSO is every claim a creditor could present to the state. SD is sovereign debt at face value, domestic and external. M2 is the money supply outstanding, every note and deposit of it a claim on the state's productive output. UO is the unfunded pension, social and health obligations at present value, with a factor of 1.00 where the source is a published actuarial present value and 0.50 where it is a raw undiscounted stream, and a 0.70 political adjustability factor on top, reflecting that a legislature can amend long-dated social commitments in a way it cannot amend a bond. CL is state guarantees and off-balance-sheet obligations at a 40 percent probability weight. The denominator holds no assets, only what is owed; a coverage ratio measures what is owned against what is owed, and mixing assets into the denominator would measure something else.

Money is counted as an obligation because that is what it is. On the central bank's own balance sheet, the currency it has issued is a liability. Before August 1971 every dollar was a claim on gold at a fixed weight, and the standard that a monetary instrument must carry backing to carry value governed monetary exchange from Bretton Woods to that date; the post-1971 legal position that a fiat currency carries no redemption obligation is a change in law, not in what money is to the holder. The unfunded obligations follow Polackova's classification of contingent and implicit liabilities (Contingent Government Liabilities: A Hidden Risk for Fiscal Stability, World Bank 1998), which showed that the largest claims on a state are often the ones absent from its debt statistics. The published present values of the United States' social obligations come from the Congressional Budget Office's long-term outlook and the trustees' reports.

5.4 The Going-Concern Multiplier

GCM = 1.50 × G_ds × G_eng × G_fis × G_mkt, range 0.09 to 1.50

A state that services its debt, engages its creditors, adjusts its budget and keeps market access is worth more to its creditors than the liquidation value of its assets, and the multiplier captures that going-concern value. G_ds is the debt service record, 1.00 when current, 0.40 in default. G_eng is creditor engagement, 1.00 under an active program, 0.50 in repudiation. G_fis is the fiscal trajectory, 1.00 with three years of falling deficits and a credible surplus path, 0.60 with an expanding deficit and no adjustment. G_mkt is market access, 1.00 at sustainable spreads, 0.50 when the state is shut out of the market. The four multiply for the reason the ACVI's factors multiply: a state in default and locked out of the market cannot offset that position with a good fiscal trajectory.

The theory is the distinction between going-concern value and liquidation value that governs every reorganization in bankruptcy, applied to a sovereign. Cruces and Trebesch (Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts, 2013) measured what creditors recovered in 180 sovereign restructurings since 1970 and showed that the size of the haircut, not the default alone, governed how long a state was shut out afterward; the multiplier scores the conduct that decides the haircut.

5.5 The insolvency gate

The gate fires when PCR < 0.50 and (TSO − GPA) > 35 percent of GDP

Both conditions must hold. When they do, the multiplier is fixed at its floor of 0.09, the score is capped at zero, and the reading is classified Structural Insolvency. The gate is binary because the condition it marks is qualitative: a state whose obligations exceed its productive estate by more than a third of a year's output, at less than half cover, is not approaching insolvency by degrees; no asset sale, restructuring or fiscal adjustment within the state's own means closes the gap. Structural Insolvency does not mean operational collapse. The state continues to function. The classification means the state's balance sheet cannot be resolved from the state's own estate.

5.6 The master formula and the three outputs

IVS = (CS − 1) × 10, bounded −10 to +10

CS = F_intrinsic × F_coverage × GCM, with F_coverage = min(√PCR, 2.00)

A composite of 1.00 is break-even and scores zero; above 1.00 the intrinsic backing exceeds the obligations and the score is positive; below 1.00 the currency's observed value exceeds its backing and the score is negative; a composite of 2.00 scores plus 10. Every reading carries three outputs together. The score. The bail-in flag: CLEAN, no legal mechanism and no precedent; YELLOW, a framework in law never exercised; RED, exercised at any level. The trajectory: IMPROVING when at least three of the four primary inputs are moving toward a higher score over twelve months, STABLE when mixed, DETERIORATING when three are moving lower. Two currencies at the same score with different flags and trajectories are different risks, and the number alone is never published without the other two.

6. The Productive Coverage Ratio, in one sentence and one sum

PCR = GPA ÷ TSO

The Productive Coverage Ratio is what the state owns divided by what the state owes. A ratio of 1.00 means the state's productive estate exactly covers its obligations. Above 1.00 the estate exceeds the obligations, and the state is solvent by the standard the formula applies. Below 1.00 the obligations exceed the estate. A ratio of 0.019 means the estate covers less than two cents of every dollar the state owes. The ratio is a point on a path, and its direction matters as much as its level; a state at 0.45 and rising is in a different position from a state at 0.45 and falling, which is what the trajectory output exists to show.

The ratio catches a strategy that every conventional measure misses. A state carrying more nominal debt than it can service has three exits: a real surplus from growth, a restructuring, or expanding the money supply until the fixed nominal debt is worth less in real terms. The third is financial repression at a moderate pace and hyperinflation at an aggressive one, and Cagan's study of the great inflations (The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation, 1956) showed how the process runs once holders expect it. Debt to GDP is blind to the strategy while it runs: nominal output rises with prices, the fixed debt does not, and the ratio improves. The PCR sees it directly, because every new note and deposit lands in the denominator at face value while the state's real assets do not rise with the printing. As the state inflates, debt to GDP improves and the PCR worsens, and that divergence is the mathematical signature of the strategy. Reinhart and Sbrancia's account of how the post-war debts were liquidated is the historical record of the same divergence.

7. How to read a score

A score is a reading on a date, from named inputs, and it moves when the inputs move. Kuwait's ACVI of 59.9 at 1 September 2026 is the product of seven factors read from the April 2026 Outlook, the July 2026 money supply, the central bank's gold and the sovereign fund's assets, and it fell six points from May because the Outlook's 2026 debt figure rose and its growth figure turned negative; nothing in the formula changed. The dollar's 0.3 is the product of a fiscal factor at 0.15, a settlement factor of 0.60, a tax factor of 0.85 and a bail-in factor of 0.20, and no movement in the year's data could lift it past 3. The direction of a reading matters as much as the level, which is why every AGSI reading carries its trajectory and why the review on this page states, currency by currency, what moved and why.

8. One standard for every currency, checkable by anyone

The same arithmetic grades the Kuwaiti dinar and the United States dollar from the same public sources, and any reader can rerun it. The sources: the IMF World Economic Outlook for debt, deficits, output and growth; the IMF's reserve composition statistics; the World Bank's constant-price output series; the World Gold Council's compilation of the IMF's gold holdings; the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; the Bank for International Settlements' payment and monetary statistics; the settlement network's currency shares; the OECD's revenue statistics; each central bank's monetary statistics; the Energy Institute's and the EIA's reserves tables; the Global SWF ranking of sovereign funds; the Congressional Budget Office and the trustees' reports for unfunded obligations. No proprietary data enters either index. A reader who disputes a reading can identify the input in dispute and produce an alternative figure from a named alternative source, and that is the correct form of engagement with an arithmetic index.

9. What the measurements mean, tangibly

A score on this page is a fact about what happens to the person holding the currency, and each of the readings below is an event that has already happened to holders.

9.1 A coverage ratio near zero

The dollar's ratio of 0.019 means the United States owns two cents of assets for every dollar it owes. A state in that position meets its promises by issuing more of them, and the holder pays in purchasing power: by the government's own price index a dollar keeps 3 percent of what it bought in 1913, and measured in gold it keeps under half of one percent. On 16 May 2025 the last rating agency withdrew the top rating from the United States, citing a decade of deficits and interest costs, the reasons the ratio has shown all along in the column the agencies do not keep, the asset column.

9.2 A RED seizure flag

In March 2013 a depositor with more than 100,000 euros at the largest bank in Cyprus lost 47.5 percent of the excess, the second bank's uninsured depositors lost everything above the guarantee, and every account in the country was frozen while it happened, under a program agreed with the European institutions and the IMF. The euro's RED flag is that event. The flag stays RED because the law that made the seizure lawful, the resolution directive of 2014, remains in force in every member state.

9.3 A low settlement and monetary reading

Between March 2022 and March 2024 the Egyptian pound was devalued four times, from about 15.7 to about 50 pounds per dollar, and consumer prices rose 32.7 percent in the year to March 2023. A family that held its savings in pounds in 2021 held a third of their dollar value by 2024. The settlement factor of 0.75, for convertibility restrictions and managed devaluations under IMF programs, and the monetary factor, for money growing far faster than output, are the readings that held that record in 2021, before the devaluations.

9.4 A high score

Kuwait has never defaulted, has kept full convertibility, levies no consumption tax, holds a sovereign fund near a trillion dollars, and holds hard assets forty times its money supply. Its ACVI of 59.9 leads the twenty. What a high score buys the holder is the thing the three readings above took from theirs: purchasing power kept and access kept. The war of 2026 moved Kuwait's score six points in four months, and the review on this page itemizes why.

9.5 Why the indexes and not the ratings

A rating answers whether the bond will pay; the indexes answer with what. The United States pays its bonds and holds an Aa1; the ACVI reads 0.3 and the coverage ratio 0.019, because a rating grades the promise and the indexes grade what stands behind it. The Basel framework assigns a sovereign's own-currency bonds a zero risk weight by convention rather than by analysis, and the AGSI performs the analysis the convention omits.

10. How to read what follows

The charts and the review that follow are the September 2026 readings for twenty currencies, and this section says what each one shows. The first chart places the May 2026 and the 1 September 2026 ACVI side by side on one scale and one method, so that a change between them is a change in the data. The second chart shows each currency's rank in May and in September, with rises in green and falls in red. The report beneath the charts carries every factor and every input with its source and date. The review carries one paragraph per currency on what moved between April and August 2026 and the events behind it. Any reader who disputes a reading is invited to name the input and the alternative source.

References

Cagan, P. (1956), The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation, in Friedman, M. (ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, University of Chicago Press. Cruces, J. and Trebesch, C. (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5(3), 85 to 117. Eichengreen, B. (2011), Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System, Oxford University Press. Farrell, H. and Newman, A. (2019), Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, International Security 44(1), 42 to 79. Fisher, I. (1911), The Purchasing Power of Money, Macmillan. Friedman, M. (1963), Inflation: Causes and Consequences, Bombay: Asia Publishing House for the Council for Economic Education. Gourinchas, P.-O. and Rey, H. (2007), From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: US External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege, in Clarida, R. (ed.), G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, University of Chicago Press. International Monetary Fund (2018), Fiscal Monitor, October 2018: Managing Public Wealth. International Monetary Fund (2013), Cyprus: Request for Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, Country Report 13/125, May 2013. Kennedy, P. (1987), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Random House. North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press. Polackova, H. (1998), Contingent Government Liabilities: A Hidden Risk for Fiscal Stability, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1989, October 1998. Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2009), This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press. Reinhart, C. and Sbrancia, M. B. (2011), The Liquidation of Government Debt, NBER Working Paper 16893. Triffin, R. (1960), Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility, Yale University Press. Financial Stability Board (2011), Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011, endorsed by the G20 at Cannes in November 2011. European Parliament and Council (2014), Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. United States Congress (2010), Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Title II. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, December 2010, revised June 2011. Moody's Ratings (16 May 2025), rating action on the Government of the United States of America.

The ACVI and the AGSI are rating indexes computed from public data. Nothing on this page is an offer, a solicitation or a public offering, or legal, financial or investment advice.